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A THEORY OF CORPORATE SCANDALS:
Why the U.S. and Europe Differ
By John C. Coffee, Jr.
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
Columbia University Law School
Abstract
A wave of financial irregularity broke out in the United States in 2001-2002,
culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A worldwide stock market bubble burst
over this same period, with the actual market decline on a percentage basis being
somewhat more severe in Europe. Yet, no corresponding wave of financial scandals
involving a similar level of companies broke out in Europe. Indeed, those scandals that
did arise in Europe often had American roots (e.g., Vivendi, Ahold, Adecco, etc.). Given
the higher level of public and private enforcement in the United States for securities fraud,
this contrast seems perplexing.
What explains this contrast? This paper submits that different kinds of scandals
characterize different systems of corporate governance. In particular, dispersed
ownership systems of governance are prone to the forms of earnings management that
erupted in the United States, but concentrated ownership systems are much less
vulnerable. Instead, the characteristic scandal in concentrated ownership economics is the
appropriation of private benefits of control. Here, Parmalat is the representative scandal,
just as Enron and WorldCom are the iconic examples of fraud in dispersed ownership
regimes.
Is this difference meaningful? This article suggests that this difference in the
likely source of, and motive for, financial misconduct has implications both for the utility
of gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries and for design of legal controls to protect
public shareholders. What works in one system will likely not work (at least as well) in
the other. The difficulty in achieving auditor independence in a corporation with a
controlling shareholder may also imply that minority shareholders in concentrated
ownership economies should directly select their own gatekeepers.

A THEORY OF CORPORATE SCANDALS: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ
By John C. Coffee, Jr.∗
Corporate scandals, particularly when they occur in concentrated outbursts, raise
serious issues that scholars have too long ignored. Two issues stand out: First, why do
different types of scandals occur in different economies? Second, why does a wave of
scandals occur in one economy, but not in another, even though both economies are
closely interconnected in the same global economy and subject to the same macroeconomic conditions? This brief essay will seek to relate answers to both questions to the
structure of share ownership.
Conventional wisdom explains a sudden concentration of corporate financial
scandals as the consequence of a stock market bubble. When the bubble burst, scandals
follow, and, eventually, new regulation.1 Historically, this has been true at least since the
South Seas Bubble, and this hypothesis works reasonably well to explain the turn-of-themillennium experience in the U.S. and Europe. Worldwide, a stock market bubble did
burst in 2000, and in percentage terms the decline was greater in many European
countries than in the United States.2 But in Europe, this sudden market decline was not
associated with the same pervasive accounting and financial irregularity that shook the
U.S. economy and produced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Indeed, financial statement
restatements are rare in Europe.3 In contrast, the U.S. witnessed an accelerating crescendo
of financial statement restatements that began in the late 1990s. The United States
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has found that over 10% of all listed companies in
the United States announced at least one financial statement restatement between 1997
∗
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and 2002.4 Later studies have placed the number even higher.5 Because a financial
statement restatement is a serious event in the United States that, depending on its
magnitude, often results in a private class action, an SEC enforcement proceeding, a
major stock price drop, and/or a management shake-up, one suspects that these
announced restatements were but the tip of the proverbial iceberg, with many more
companies negotiating changes in their accounting practices with their outside auditors
that averted a formal restatement.
While Europe also had financial scandals over this same period (with the Parmalat
scandal being the most notorious6), most were characteristically different than the U.S.
style of earnings manipulation scandal (of which Enron and WorldCom were the iconic
examples). Only European firms cross-listed in the United States seem to have
encountered similar crises of earnings management.7 What explains this difference and
the difference in frequency? This short essay will advance a simple, almost self-evident
thesis: differences in the structure of share ownership account for differences in corporate
scandals, both in terms of the nature of the fraud, the identity of the perpetrators, and the
seeming disparity in the number of scandals at any given time. In dispersed ownership
systems, corporate managers tend to be the rogues of the story, while in concentrated
ownership systems, it is controlling shareholders who play the corresponding role.
Although this point may seem obvious, its corollary is less so: the modus operandi of
fraud is also characteristically different. Corporate managers tend to engage in earnings
manipulation, while controlling shareholders tend to exploit the private benefits of
control. Finally, and most importantly, given these differences, the role of gatekeepers in
these two systems must necessarily also be different.8 While gatekeepers failed both at
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Enron and Parmalat, they failed in characteristically different ways. In turn, different
reforms may be justified, and the panoply of reforms adopted in the United States,
culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, may not be the appropriate remedy in
Europe.
Part I will review the recent American scandals to identify common denominators
and the underlying motivation that caused the sudden eruption of financial statement
restatements. Part II will turn to the evidence on private benefits of control in
concentrated ownership systems. Patterns also emerge here in terms of the maturity of the
capital market. Part III will advance some tentative conclusions about the differences in
monitoring structures that are appropriate under different ownership regimes.
Part I. Fraud in Dispersed Ownership Systems
While studies differ, all show a rapid acceleration in financial statement
restatements in the United States during the 1990s. The earliest of these studies finds that
the number of earnings restatements by publicly held U.S. corporations averaged roughly
forty-nine per year from 1990 to 1997, then increased to ninety-one in 1998, and then
soared to 150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively.9 A later study by the United States
General Accounting Office shows an even more dramatic acceleration, as set forth in
Figure I:10
[Insert Figure I]
Even this study understated the severity of this sudden spike in accounting irregularity.
Because companies do not uniformly report a restatement in the same fashion, the GAO
was not able to catch all restatements in its study. A more recent, fuller study in 2003 by
Huron Consulting Group shows the following results: in 1990, there were 33 earnings
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restatements; in 1995, there were fifty;11 then, the rate truly accelerated to 216 in 1999; to
233 in 2000; to 270 in 2001; and then in 2002, the number peaked at 330 (ten times the
1990 level).12 On this basis, roughly one in eight listed companies restated over this
period. An update this year by Huron Consulting shows that the number of restatements
fell to 323 in 2003 and then rose again to 414 in 2004.13
Nor were these restatements merely technical adjustments. Although some
actually increased earnings, the GAO study found that the typical restating firm lost an
average 10% of its market capitalization over a three day trading period surrounding the
date of the announcement.14 All told, the GAO estimated the total market losses
(unadjusted for other market movements) at $100 billion for restating firms in its
incomplete sample for 1997-2002.15
Other studies have reached similar results. Studying a comprehensive sample of
firms that restated annual earnings from 1971 to 2000, Richardson, Tuna and Wu
reported a negative market reaction to the announcement of the restatement of 11% over
a three-day window surrounding the announcement.16 Moreover, using a wider window
that measured firm value over a period beginning 120 days prior to the announcement to
120 days after the announcement, they found that restating “firms lose on average 25
percent of market value over the period examined and this is concentrated in a narrow
window surrounding the announcement of the restatement.”17 25% of market value
represents an extraordinary market penalty. It shows the market not simply to have been
surprised, but to have taken the restatement as a signal of fraud. For example, in the cases
of Cendant, MicroStrategy, and Sunbeam, three major U.S. corporate scandals in the late
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1990s, they found that “these three firms lost more than $23 billion in the week
surrounding their respective restatement announcements.”18
The intensity of the market’s negative reaction to an earnings restatement appears
to be greatest when the restatement involved revenue recognition issues.19 One study
examining just the period from 1997 to 1999 found that firms in which revenue
recognition issues caused the restatement experienced a market adjusted loss of -13.38%
over a window period beginning three days before the announcement and continuing until
three days after the announcement.20 Yet, despite the market’s fear of such practices,
revenue recognition errors became the dominant cause of restatements in the period from
1997 to 2002. The GAO Report found that revenue recognition issues accounted for
almost 38 percent of the restatements it identified over that period,21 and the Huron
Consulting Group study also found it to be the leading accounting issue underlying an
earnings restatement between 1999 and 2003.22
The prevalence of revenue recognition problems, even in the face of the market’s
sensitivity to them, shows a significant change in managerial behavior in the United
States. During earlier periods, U.S. managements famously employed “rainy day
reserves” to hold back the recognition of income that was in excess of the market’s
expectation in order to defer its recognition until some later quarter when there had been
a shortfall in expected earnings. In effect, managers engage in income-smoothing, rolling
the peaks in one period over into the valley of the next period. This traditional form of
earnings management was intended to mask the volatility of earnings and reassure
investors who might have been alarmed by rapid fluctuations in earnings. In contrast,
managers in the late 1990s appear to have characteristically “stolen” earnings from future
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periods in order to create an earnings spike that potentially could not be sustained. Why?
Although it had long been known that restating firms were typically firms with high
market expectations for future growth, the pressure on these firms to show a high rate of
earnings growth appears to have increased during the 1990s.
What, in turn, caused this increased pressure? To a considerable extent, it appears
to have been self-induced – that is, the product of increasingly optimistic predictions by
managements to financial analysts as to future earnings. But this answer just translates
the prior question into a different format: Why did managements become more optimistic
about earnings growth over this period? Here, one explanation does distinguish the U.S.
from Europe, and it has increasingly been viewed as the best explanation for the sudden
spike in financial irregularity in the U.S.23 Put simply, executive compensation abruptly
shifted in the United States during the 1990s, moving from a cash-based system to an
equity based system. More importantly, this shift was not accompanied by any
compensating change in corporate governance to control the predictably perverse
incentives that reliance on stock options can create.
One measure of the suddenness of this shift is the change over the decade in the
median compensation of a CEO of an S&P 500 Industrial company. As of 1990, the
median such CEO made $1.25 million with 92% of that amount paid in cash and 8% in
equity.24 But during the 1990s, both the scale and composition of executive compensation
changed. By 2001, the median CEO of an S&P industrial company was earning over $6
million, of which 66% was in equity.25 Figure II shows the swiftness of this transition:26
[Insert Figure II]
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To illustrate the impact of this change, assume a CEO holds options on two million
shares of his company’s stock and that the company is trading at a price to earnings ratio
of 30 to 1 (both reasonable assumptions for this era). On this basis, if the CEO can cause
the “premature” recognition of revenues that result in an increase in annual earnings by
simply $1 per share, the CEO has caused a $30 price increase that should make him $60
million richer. Not a small incentive!
Obviously, when one pays the CEO with stock options, one creates incentives for
short-term financial manipulation and accounting gamesmanship. Financial economists
have found a strong statistical correlation between higher levels of equity compensation
and both earnings management and financial restatements. One recent study by Efendi,
Srivastava and Swanson utilized a control group methodology and constructed two
groups of companies, each composed of 100 listed public companies.27 The first group’s
members had restated their financial statements in 2001 or 2002, while the control group
was composed of otherwise similar firms that had not restated. What characteristic most
distinguished the two groups? The leading factor that proved most to influence the
likelihood of a restatement was the presence of a substantial amount of “in the money”
stock options in the hands of the firm’s CEO. The CEOs of the firms in the restating
group held on average “in the money” options of $30.9 million, while CEOs in the nonrestating control group averaged only $2.3 million – a nearly 14 to 1 difference.28 Further,
if a CEO held options equaling or exceeding 20 times his or her annual salary (and this
was the 80th percentile in their study – meaning that a substantial number of CEOs did
exceed this level), the likelihood of a restatement increased by 55%.
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Other studies have reached similar results. Denis, Hanouna, and Sarin find a
significant positive relationship between a firm’s use of option-based compensation and
securities fraud allegations being leveled against the firm.29 Further, they find in their
study of 358 companies charged with fraud between 1993 and 2002 that the likelihood of
a fraud charge is positively related to “option intensity” – i.e. the greater the amount of
the options, the higher the likelihood.30 Similarly, Cheng and Warfield have documented
that corporate managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent
periods, are more likely to report earnings that just meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts,
and more frequently engage in other forms of earnings management.31 As stock options
increase the managers’ equity ownership, they also increase their need to diversify the
high risk associated with such ownership, and this produces both more efforts to inflate
earnings to prevent a stock price decline and increased sales by managers in advance of
any earnings decline. In short, there is a “dark side” to option-based compensation for
senior executives: absent special controls, more options means more fraud.
At this point, the contrast between managerial incentives in the U.S. and Europe
comes into clearer focus. These differences involve both the scale of compensation and
its composition. In 2004, CEO compensation as a multiple of average employee
compensation was estimated to be 531:1 in the U.S., but only 16:1 in France, 11:1 in
Germany, 10:1 in Japan, and 21:1 in nearby Canada. Even Great Britain, with the most
closely similar system of corporate governance to the U.S., had only a 25:1 ratio.32 But
even more important is the shift towards compensating the chief executive primarily with
stock options. While stock options have come to be widely used in recent years in Europe,
equity compensation constitutes a much lower percentage of total CEO compensation
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(even in the U.K., it was only 24% in 2002).33 European CEOs not only make much less,
but their total compensation is also much less performance related.34
What explains these differences? Compensation experts in the U.S. usually
emphasize the tax laws in the United States, which were amended in the early 1990s to
restrict the corporate deductibility of high cash compensation and thus induced
corporations to use equity in preference to cash.35 But this is only part of the fuller story.
Much of the explanation is that institutional investors in the U.S. pressured companies for
a shift towards equity compensation. Why? Institutional investors, who hold the majority
of the stock in publicly held companies in the U.S., understand that, in a system of
dispersed ownership, executive compensation is probably their most important tool by
which to align managerial incentives with shareholder incentives. Throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, they had seen senior managements of large corporations manage their firms in
a risk-averse and growth-maximizing fashion, retaining “free cash flow” to the maximum
extent possible. Such a style of management produced the bloated, and inefficient
conglomerates of that era (for example, Gulf & Western and IT&T). Put simply, a system
of exclusively cash compensation creates incentives to avoid risk and bankruptcy and to
maximize the size of the firm, regardless of profitability, because a larger firm size
generally implies higher cash compensation for its senior managers.
Once the U.S. tax laws and institutional pressure together produced a shift to
equity compensation in the 1990s, managers’ incentives changed, and managers sought to
maximize share value (as the institutions had wanted). But what the institutions failed to
anticipate was that there can be too much of a good thing. Aggressive use of these
incentives in turn encouraged the use of manipulative techniques to maximize stock price
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over the short-run. Although such spikes may not be sustainable, corporate managers
possess asymmetric information, and anticipating their inability to maintain earnings
growth, they can exercise their options and bail out.
One measure of this transition is the changing nature of financial irregularities.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC to study all its enforcement proceedings over
the prior five years (i.e., 1997-2002) to ascertain what kinds of financial and accounting
irregularities were the most common. Out of the 227 “enforcement matters” pursued by
the SEC over this period, the SEC has reported that 126 (or 55%) alleged “improper
revenue recognition.”36 Similarly, the earlier noted GAO Study found that 38% of all
restatements in its survey were for revenue recognition timing errors. Either managers
were recognizing the next period’s revenues prematurely – or managers were simply
inventing revenues that did not exist. Both forms of errors suggest that managers were
striving to manufacture an artificial (and possibly unsustainable) spike in corporate
income.
That managers were able to optimistically predict and prematurely recognize
revenues in ways that ultimately compelled earnings restatements shows a market failure
– particularly when the market penalty for premature revenue recognition was, as earlier
noted, so Draconian as to result in a 25% decline in market price on average.37 Why did
securities analysts accept such optimistic predictions and not discount them? Here, the
evidence is that very few analysts downgraded public companies in the months prior to
earnings restatements – even though short sellers and insiders had recognized the
likelihood of an earnings restatement.38 Yet, while analysts and auditors may have been
slow to recognize premature revenue recognition, considerable evidence suggests that
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short sellers were able to recognize the signals and profit handsomely by anticipating
earnings restatements.39 The implications of this point are that smart traders could and did
do what professional gatekeepers were insufficiently motivated to do: recognize the
approach of major market collapses. In short, this is a story of “gatekeeper failure” in that
the professional agents of corporate governance did not adequately serve investors. In
consequence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 understandably focused on gatekeepers
and contained provisions regulating auditors, securities analysts and credit-rating
agencies.
Part II. Fraud in Concentrated Ownership Regimes.
The pattern in concentrated ownership systems is very different, but not
necessarily better. In the case of most European corporations, there is a controlling
shareholder or shareholder group. Why is this important? A controlling shareholder does
not need to rely on indirect mechanisms of control, such as equity compensation or stock
options, in order to incentivize management. Rather, it can rely on a “command and
control” system because, unlike the dispersed shareholders in the U.S., it can directly
monitor and replace management. Hence, corporate managers have both less discretion to
engage in opportunistic earnings management and less motivation to create an earnings
spike (because it will not benefit a management not compensated with stock options).
Equally important, the controlling shareholder also has much less interest in the
day-to-day stock price of its company. Why? Because the controlling shareholder seldom,
if ever, sells its control block into the public market. Rather, if it sells at all, it will make a
privately negotiated sale at a substantial premium over the market price to an incoming,
new controlling shareholder. Such control premiums are characteristically much higher in
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Europe than in the United States. As a result, controlling shareholders in Europe do not
obsess over the day-to-day market price and rationally do not engage in tactics to
prematurely recognize revenues to spike their stock price. These two explanations –
lesser use of equity compensation and lesser interest in the short-term stock price –
explain at least in part why there were less accounting irregularities in Europe than in the
U.S. during the late 1990s.
This generalization may seem subject to counter-examples. For example, some
well-known European companies – e.g., Vivendi Universal, Royal Ahold, Skandia
Insurance or Adecco40 – did experience accounting irregularities. But these are
exceptions that prove the rule. All were U.S. listed companies whose accounting
problems emanated from U.S. based subsidiaries or that had transformed themselves into
American-style conglomerates (the leading example being Vivendi) that either awarded
stock options or needed to maximize their short-term stock price in order to make
multiple acquisitions.
Does this analysis imply that European managers are more ethical or that
European shareholders are better off than their American counterparts? By no means!
Concentrated ownership encourages a different type of financial overreaching: the
extraction of private benefits of control. Dyck and Zingales have shown that the private
benefits of control vary significantly across jurisdictions, ranging from -4% to +65%,
depending in significant part on the legal protections given minority shareholders.41
While there is evidence that the market cares about the level of private benefits that
controlling shareholders will extract,42 the market has a relatively weak capacity to
discern on a real time basis what benefits are in fact being expropriated.
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In emerging markets, the expropriation of private benefits typically occurs
through financial transactions. Ownership may be diluted through public offerings, and
then a coercive tender offer or squeeze-out merger is used to force minority shareholders
to tender at a price below fair market value. These techniques have been discussed in
detail elsewhere and in their crudest forms have been given the epithet “tunneling” to
describe them.43 A classic example was the Bulgarian experience between 1999 and 2002,
when roughly two-thirds of the 1,040 firms on the Bulgarian stock exchange were
delisted, following freeze-out tender offers for the minority shares at below market, but
still coercive, prices.44
In more developed economies, such financial transactions may be precluded.
Instead, “operational” mechanisms can be used: for example, controlling shareholders
can compel the company to sell its output to, or buy its raw materials from, a corporation
that they independently own. In emerging markets, growing evidence suggests that firms
within corporate groups engage in more related party transactions that firms that are not
members of a controlled group.45 In essence, these transactions permit controlling
shareholders to transfer resources from companies in which they have lesser cash flow
rights to ones in which they have greater cash flow rights.46
Although it may be tempting to deem “tunneling” and related opportunistic
practices as characteristic only of emerging markets where legal protections are still
evolving, considerable evidence suggests that such practices are also prevalent in more
“mature” European economies.47 Indeed, some students of European corporate
governance claim that the dominant form of concentrated ownership (i.e., absolute
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majority ownership) is simply inefficient because it permits too much predatory
misbehavior.48
This provocative question need not here be resolved, but the nature of the
scandals that characterize concentrated ownership systems does merit our attention
because they show a distinct and different type of gatekeeper failure. Two recent scandals
typify this pattern: Parmalat and Hollinger. Parmalat is the paradigmatic fraud for
Europe (just as Enron and WorldCom are the representative frauds in the United States).
Parmalat’s fraud essentially involved the balance sheet, not the income statement. It
failed when a 3.9 billion euros account with Bank of America proved to be fictitious.49 At
least, $17.4 billion in assets seemed to vanish from its balance sheet. Efforts by its trustee
to track down these missing funds appear to have found that at least 2.3 billion euros
were paid to affiliated persons and shareholders.50 In short, private benefits appear to
have siphoned off to controlling shareholders through related party transactions. Unlike
the short-term stock manipulations that occur in the U.S., this was a scandal that had
continued for many years, probably for over a decade.
At the heart of the Parmalat fraud, there was also a failure by its gatekeepers.
Parmalat’s auditors for many years had been an American-based firm, Grant Thornton,
whose personnel had audited Parmalat and its subsidiaries since the 1980s.51 Although
Italian law uniquely mandated the rotation of audit firms, Grant, Thornton found an easy
evasion. It gave up the role of being auditor to the parent company in the Parmalat family,
but continued to audit its subsidiaries.52 Among these subsidiaries was the Caymans
Islands based subsidiary, Boulat Financing Corporation, whose books showed the
fictitious Bank of America account whose discovery triggered Parmalat’s insolvency.53
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The recent Hollinger scandal also involved overreaching by controlling
shareholders. Although Hollinger International is a Delaware corporation, its controlling
shareholders were Canadian, as were most of its shareholders. According to the report
prepared by counsel to its independent directors, former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden,
Hollinger was a “kleptocracy”.54 Its controlling shareholders allegedly siphoned off more
than $400 million from Hollinger – or more than 95% of the company’s adjusted net
income from 1997 to 2003.55 On sales of assets by Hollinger, its controlling shareholders
secretly took large side payments, which they directed be paid to themselves out of the
sales proceeds.56 But bad as the Hollinger case may be, little evidence suggest that Lord
Black and his cronies manipulated earnings through premature revenue recognition. What
this contrast shows is that controlling shareholders may misappropriate assets, but have
much less reason to fabricate earnings. This does not mean that business ethics are better
(or worse) within a concentrated ownership regime, but only that the modus operandi for
fraud is different. The real conclusion is that different systems of ownership encourage
characteristically different styles of fraud.
Part III. Gatekeeper Failure Across Ownership Regimes
Both ownership regimes – dispersed and concentrated – show evidence of
gatekeeper failure. The U.S./U.K. system of dispersed ownership is vulnerable to
gatekeepers not detecting inflated earnings, and concentrated ownership systems fail to
the extent that gatekeepers miss (or at least fail to report) the expropriation of private
benefits. A key difference, of course, is that in dispersed ownership systems the villains
are managers and the victims are shareholders, while, in concentrated ownership systems,
the controlling shareholders overreach minority shareholders.
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In turn, this raises the critical issue: can gatekeepers in concentrated ownership
systems monitor the controlling shareholder who hires (and potentially can fire) them?
Although there clearly have been numerous failures by gatekeepers in dispersed
ownership systems, the answer for these systems probably lies in principle in redesigning
the governance circuitry within the public corporation so that the gatekeeper does not
report to those that it is expected to monitor. Thus, the auditor or attorney can be required
to report to an independent audit committee rather than corporate managers. But this
same answer does not work as well in a concentrated ownership system. In such a system,
even an independent audit committee may serve at the pleasure of a controlling
shareholder.
Indeed, some forms of gatekeepers common in dispersed ownership systems seem
inherently less likely to be effective in a system of concentrated ownership. For example,
the securities analyst is inherently a gatekeeper for dispersed ownership regimes. In
concentrated ownership regimes, the volume of stock trading in its thinner capital
markets is likely to be insufficient to generate brokerage commissions sufficient to
support a profession of analysts covering all publicly held companies. But even if analyst
coverage in concentrated ownership regimes were equivalent to that in dispersed
ownership systems, the analyst’s predictions of the firm’s future earnings or value would
still mean less to public shareholders if the controlling shareholder remained in a position
to squeeze-out the minority shareholders.
Even the role of the auditor differs in a concentrated ownership system. The
existence of a controlling shareholder necessarily affects auditor independence. In a
dispersed ownership system, corporate managers might sometimes “capture” the audit
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partner of their auditor (as seemingly happened at Enron). But the policy answer was
obvious (and Sarbanes-Oxley quickly adopted it): rewire the internal circuitry so that the
auditor reported to an independent audit committee. However, in a concentrated
ownership system, this answer works less well because the auditor is still reporting to a
board that is, itself, potentially subservient to the controlling shareholder. Thus, the
auditor in this system is a monitor who cannot effectively escape the control of the party
that it is expected to monitor. Although diligent auditors could have presumably detected
the fraud at Parmalat (at least to the extent of detecting the fictitious bank account at the
Cayman Islands subsidiary), one suspects that they would have likely been dismissed at
the point at which they began to monitor earnestly. More generally, auditors can do little
to stop squeeze-out mergers, coercive tender offers, or even unfair related party
transactions. These require statutory protections if the minority’s rights are to be
protected. In fairness, shareholders in a concentrated ownership system may receive some
protection from other gatekeepers, including the large banks that typically monitor the
corporation.
There is an important historical dimension to this point. The independent auditor
arose in Britain in the middle 19th Century, just as industrialization and the growth of
railroads was compelling corporations to market their shares to a broader audience of
investors.57 Amendments in 1844 and 1845 to the British Companies Act required an
annual statutory audit with the auditor being selected by the shareholders.58 This made
sense, because the auditor was thus placed in a true principal/agent relationship with the
shareholders who relied on it. But this same relationship does not exist when the auditor
reports to shareholders in a system in which there is a controlling shareholder. Finally,
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even if the auditor is asked to report on the fairness of inter-corporate dealings or related
party transactions, this is not its core competence. Other protections – such as
supermajority votes, mandatory bid requirements, or prophylactic rules – may be far
more valuable in protecting minority shareholders when there is a controlling shareholder.
This may explain the slower development of auditing procedures and internal controls in
Europe.
Potentially, there is a further implication for the use of gatekeepers in
concentrated ownership economies. If the controlling shareholder can potentially
dominate the selection of the auditor or other gatekeepers, then it becomes at least
arguable that if the auditor is to serve as an effective reputational intermediary, it should
be selected by the minority shareholders and report to them. This article will not attempt
to design such an unprecedented system, but will smugly content itself with pointing out
the likely inadequacy of alternative systems. The second-best alternative would appear to
be according the auditor’s selection, retention and compensation to the independent
directors.
Conclusion
This article’s generalizations are not presented as iron laws. “Private benefits of
control” can be misappropriated in a U.S. public company, and recent illustrations
include the Tyco and Adelphia scandals. Similarly, companies with dispersed ownership
are now common (but still the minority) in Europe. Public policy needs, however, to start
from the recognition that dispersed ownership creates managerial incentives to
manipulate income, while concentrated ownership invites the low-visibility extraction of
private benefits. As a result, governance protections that work in one system may fail in
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the other. Even more importantly, different gatekeepers need to be designed into different
governance systems to monitor for different abuses.
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